Analytical Philosophy on the Russian Stage. Adaptation and Development (1913–1959)*

A. S. Kolesnikov

St. Petersburg State University,
7–9, Universitetskaya nab., St. Petersburg, 199034, Russian Federation

For citation: Kolesnikov A. S. Analytical Philosophy on the Russian Stage. Adaptation and Development (1913–1959). *Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies*, 2024, vol. 40, issue 4, pp. 582–594. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2024.402

The article reveals the characteristics of adaptation and development of analytical philosophy on the Russian stage in the period of 1913–1959. Scientists and philosophers were familiar with the first and second Positivism, and familiarity with analytical philosophy was mediated by the latest work in logic and mathematics, the reduction of mathematics to logic, and logic to philosophy. Publications of Russell's work *'Problems of Philosophy'* and *'Treatise'* by Wittgenstein were of special importance, as well as considerations on the sensory data as the basis of new realism, the role of language, sign, semantics, and artificial languages in their role of studying the world. It is shown that it was in line with analytical philosophy that Russian thinkers developed making accent at the very topical problems of logic and mathematics, philosophy of science and theory of knowledge; the problem of universals, the relevance of which is associated with the idea of correspondence between the structure of language and the structure of the world; development of a semantic theory of discursive knowledge, a theory of meaning were important because the study of linguistic signs was declared to be the only means of objective knowledge of thinking. Domestic philosophers have learned that the rational meaning of realism in the philosophy of mathematics is the statement that the fundamental structures of mathematics are directly related to categorical ideas about reality, they seem to merge with ontology, absorb some aspects of categorical ideas, providing the corresponding concepts with the status of universality and intuitive clarity and a certain independence from the formal language of mathematics. Thus, in logic, the problems of language, the problem of interpreting sign dependencies come to the foreground. In the philosophical literature of the 1950s, the image of representatives of analytical philosophy as subjective idealists gradually emerged, while the roots of subjectivism lie in fundamental epistemological principles, and not in specific ways of their implementation.

Keywords: empiricism, realism, logical positivism, analytical philosophy, Russell, Wittgenstein, philosophy of language, problem of universals.

Introduction

Let us turn to the formation and development of the school, the study and application of the concepts and methods of analytical philosophy in Russia (and in the U.S.S.R.). We are talking about its reception in our country, as well as identifying the positive content of

* The study was supported by the Russian Science Foundation grant no. 24-28-00295, https://rscf.ru/project/24-28-00295/; Russian Christian Humanitarian Academy named after. F.M. Dostoevsky.

the ideas of domestic authors who independently develop the ideas of analytical philosophy, being also its critics and recipients.

Positivism, both the first and the second, were quite well known in Russia. As for analytical philosophy, which became the basis of the third Positivism, one of its founders, Bertrand Russell, is in the vanguard. His article *'The Latest Works on the Principles of Mathematics'* (1901/1913) is translated into Russian. Russell notes that many people believe that the subject of this science is arithmetic, algebra, geometry, etc., but many people did not understand what the general idea of all these doctrines is and how it differs from applied mathematics. J. Boole dedicated *'The Laws of Thought'* (1854) to formal logic, i. e. mathematics. Pure mathematics proceeds from the fact that if one sentence is true, then some other is true. Then a plausible hypothesis is selected and its consequences are derived. If our hypothesis relates not to one or more particular things, *but to anything*, then, our conclusions constitute mathematics. So, mathematics is "a doctrine in which we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true" [1, p. 322–323]. All pure mathematics is built from the conjugation of primitive axioms, i. e. from syllogism and other rules of inference. "Philosophers have debated for centuries whether such conclusions are possible; mathematicians have drawn a conclusion and philosophers can only thank them". Many rules of inference and a new branch of logic, 'relational logic' which works with symbols, were discovered. It turns out that the entire system of arithmetic and algebra needs only three indefinable concepts and five unprovable propositions [1, p. 323, 324]. Peano reduced much of mathematics to precise symbolic form, where words are absent. The characters zero, number followed by, are entered. These three symbols can be expressed through the concepts of relation and class. Due to this, the reliability of mathematics extended to mathematical philosophy. Thus, the nature of infinity, continuity, space, time and motion are no longer subject to doubt and dispute. The essence of these phenomena was studied by Peano and Cantor. Weierstrass, expelling the infinite: small from mathematics, showed that we live in an unchanging world. Analysis required continuity, and it needed infinitesimals. Weierstrass showed that mathematics can deal without them.

However, Cantor found that all the proofs contrary to the idea of infinity contained a certain principle, obvious at first glance, but which, when strictly carried out, destroys almost all mathematics. Whereas the evidence favorable to the idea of infinity did not contain any beginning leading to absurd consequences. The proof that all pure mathematics, including geometry, coincides with formal logic was a fatal blow to Kant's philosophy. His doctrine of *a priori* judgments is unacceptable to mathematics in its modern form. We need the widest possible development of mathematical logic, to clarify the importance of relationships and to substantiate on this solid basis a new philosophical logic that borrows both accuracy and reliability from its mathematical foundation.

At the beginning of the century, the works by R. Dedekind (1905) [2], A. Poincaré (1910) [3], and E. Cassirer (1912) [4] were translated. A work that asserts knowledge of the expressed judgments is *'Introduction to Mathematics'* by A. N. Whitehead (1916) [5]. It is concluded in the words of the author: "If it were not for the fact that all our perceptions are accompanied by a sense of spatiality and duration and that lines, surfaces, volumes and time are all quantities of a certain kind, the theory of numbers would play a secondary role in the study of the laws of the universe. Somehow Be that as it may, the science of nature rests chiefly on the ideas of number, magnitude, space and time" [5, p. 229].

Problems of philosophy

In 1914, Russell's significant work *'Problems of Philosophy'* was translated, which, at that time, was apparently known to a limited circle of researchers [6]. It still enjoys attention because it simply explains many problems of analytical philosophy. In 1918, the famous teacher and a gifted philosopher P. P. Blonsky (1884–1941) in his *'Modern Philosophy'* evaluates that work, shows his knowledge of new trends in Western philosophy, as well as a striking instinct for their future fate. What is important for us is that Blonsky explains: the theory of knowledge occupies a broader place than metaphysics, and many issues discussed by philosophers are either not touched upon at all or touched upon very briefly. Russell's work provides an opportunity to appreciate important concepts of the time. Among them are the existence and nature of matter, types of knowledge and induction, the possibility of knowledge a priori, the world of universals and their knowledge, truth and lies, knowledge, error and probable knowledge, the boundaries of philosophical knowledge and the value of philosophy. Knowledge about things in the external world is carried out by sensations. Physical objects form a collection called matter. But does it exist and, if so, what is its nature? [7, p. 8] Idealists claim that "there is nothing real except the spirit and its ideas" [7, p. 11]. The same reason applies to matter: it is either a collection of ideas, as in Berkeley, or a conglomerate of elementary spirits, as in Leibniz. Everyone recognizes the existence of real objects, but this is an 'apparent' manifestation of some 'hidden' reality behind this 'apparent' [7, p. 12]. However, "If I do not have confidence in the independent existence of objects, then I remain alone in the desert, and the entire outside world turns into a dream, and only I exist" [7, p. 13]. We have no doubt about the relativity of our sensations about the objects we see. But are our sensations manifestations of physical objects?

Against this background, Blonsky believes that it is important to familiarize yourself with the work, which solves the problem of cognition of the external world in an 'extremely unique' way. For Russell argues that philosophy must have only the scientific method, and for this it must be logic, this 'inventory of possibilities'. So: philosophy is logic, its propositions are *a priori* analytical, and its method is analysis. [8, p. 10–12.] Logistics seeks to reduce philosophy and mathematics to logic. Blonsky outlines its essence, quoting Cantor and Hilbert, Russell, Couturat, Peano, Frege, and Wittgenstein. Couturat examined the results of logistics and found that the mathematical treatises of Russell and Peano were written in symbolic language without using the words of ordinary language and the approaches associated with it.

To build a certain new logic richer than the traditional one in combinations, Russell, instead of Aristotle's classical logic, substantiates the logic of propositions, with a basic hypothetical syllogism. The new logic should be a powerful tool of 'scientific' philosophy, the field of action of which is our knowledge of the external world. To make the problem of the external world a logical-mathematical problem, he declares physical objects to be functions of sense data. In other words, one should not 'deduce' the existence of common sense things, atoms, space and time, but 'construct' all this hypothetically, mentally or logically. The new logic provides enormous possibilities for logical forms, scope for logical imagination and material for a huge number of logical constructions regarding empirical facts. "The conclusion is this: wherever possible, it is worth replacing physical entities with logical constructs" [9, p. 278]. Those, Russell reduces philosophy to formal logic. "Russell's

teaching is, as it were, a new kind of transition from idealism to transcendental realism" [10, p. 205].

Again, for educational purposes, half a century later, the analysis of *'Problems of Philosophy'* is given by A. P. Sheptulin in a textbook when analyzing the relationship between the individual and the general [11]. Russell develops his theses in *'Human Knowledge'*: universal propositions arising from perception apply only to a certain period of time during which the observation continued [10, p. 523]. Then, the general principles of knowledge are not true, equally applicable to any mental operation or mental processing of any sensory data, for we have no certainty about the fact that they will act every time. All our behavior is based on the connectedness of phenomena occurring in the past, we simply believe in its implementation in the future, which is based on the principle of induction [10, p. 189]. Thus, based on sensory data and experience, we will not be able to prove the truth of any general judgment and the very principles of knowledge. This is an apriorism that does not require proof through sensory experience [10, p. 24, 540].

The problem of universals

To confirm general knowledge, the thinker puts forward a theory of the objective existence of universals, the knowledge of which leads to the emergence of *a priori* general knowledge, i.e. the existence of the general separately from the individual [10, p. 71–72]. The general exists as something repeated in a number of individual phenomena and relationships, which always have unique, individual features, i. e. not independently, but in inextricable unity with the individual. The desire to attribute existence to universals in some other sense than all material individual things and relations is quite understandable. If they exist just like all other things, then all the evidence speaks for the fact that they do not exist independently, separately from sensory things and relations, but only through the latter. Their independent existence presupposes some special way of knowing them, which does not take into account experience, but despite the latter gives true knowledge. Trying to prove the non-spatial and timeless existence of universals, Russell turned to space-temporal facts. But if we look for universals in individual things and relationships existing in space and time, then do they also have a spatiotemporal existence? But not a single argument in favor of such existence has been given. As for the knowledge of universals, at first it is no different from the knowledge of individual things and begins with perception [10, p. 85–86]. Then comes acquaintance with the universal of relation, and in the process of further study of perceived phenomena, he learns the relationships between universals. So we can "see the relations of universals and cognize general a priori provisions, like the provisions of arithmetic and logic" [10, p. 78]. So, if somewhere outside of time and space, some universals exist independently, separately from material things and phenomena, then their knowledge gives eternal, unchanging, always true provisions, which do not necessarily need to be substantiated by experience.

It is worth noting the significance of the problem of universals in the system of philosophical problems that embrace it in Russian philosophy. First of all, it has a close connection with cardinal issues of epistemology and logical semantics. The problems that arise in the course of studying the process of cognition and clarifying the relationship between the cognizing subject, the world of objects of his comprehension, and the language constructs he uses to convey his experience lead to the development of a theory of meaning,

the renewal of which entails a transformation of the theory of universals. The relevance of the topic is connected with the idea of correspondence between the structure of language and the structure of the world, which is assumed in any formulation of the problem of universals; the idea of irreducibility of meaning to denotations, which allows us to conclude that it is arbitrary for universal linguistic symbols to have universal referents in the objective world. The enduring interest in universals is due to the problem of intersubjectivity generated by the theory of knowledge, which helps to deepen the understanding of the functions of language. In this case, a problem arises: how to explain and resolve the contradiction, which consists in the fact that knowledge, the starting point of obtaining which is sensory data (individuals), is nevertheless of a generally valid nature and operates with general concepts (universals).

E. E. Lednikov [12], I. S. Narsky [13], E. D. Smirnova [14], G. D. Levin [15], etc. wrote in the 1970–1980s on the connection between Russell's understanding of universals and the theories of Frege, Wittgenstein, and Quine**.** It was noted that the problem of universals underlies any study of issues of cognition and understanding, for such a study necessarily involves the classification of objects and the corresponding linguistic and non-linguistic means used by the subject in the process of cognition. There are four views on the traditional problem of universals: common sense, Platonism, Conceptualism, and Nominalism. But there is also a Dialectical-Materialist solution. It is believed that the debates between Medieval Nominalists and Realists about the meaning of general concepts have long lost their relevance, because in Dialectical Materialism the dialectics of the individual and the general was developed (E. E. Lednikov). E. V. Ilyenkov and V. V. Davydov formulated that solving the problem by means of traditional theory inevitably leads to a type of Nominalism [16, p. 55; 17]. Its true solution is possible only from the standpoint of the concrete-universal [15, p. 95–110, 159–161].

So, in the 1910s, interest arises in Russell as a logician and epistemologist, and Russell's theoretical monograph, *'Problems of Philosophy'* (1914), shows that we have before us an original thinker of a new formation. In the 1920s, the book *'Daedalus and Icarus (The Future of Science)'* was published (Russell co-authored with J. B. Holden). Holden wrote that "the inventor in the field of chemistry or physics is always a kind of Prometheus" [18, p. 35]. Russell expresses "fears that the new science will rather serve to strengthen the power of the dominant parties than to increase human well-being. The mythical Icarus… died due to his own rashness. I am afraid that a similar fate may befall the peoples whom modern science has taught to fly" [18, p. 65].

Discussions of the 1920s

In the 1920s, in Russia there were fierce discussions about the future of philosophy [19]. D. Lukács, A. Varyash (Hungary), A. Thalheimer (Germany) took part in it. Thus, Varyash published works in which he convinced that mathematics is applicable not only to the study of quantitative parameters, but also to the study of qualitatively unique phenomena. The severity of the class-political confrontation of that time simplified to the limit the idea of the relationship between philosophical directions and political directions, connecting them in an equally simplified way with relations to religion and science, spirit and nature. But, beyond the framework of Materialism and Idealism, there are many problems (causality, free will, space and time, the systemic nature of the world, the method of

scientific research, etc.) that are relatively independent and are not a simple concretization of the main question of philosophy [19, p. 11].

Non-Marxist philosophy was represented by such names as N. A. Berdyaev, L. I. Shestov, S. L. Frank, G. G. Shpet, L. A. Lossky, etc. Their works contained a lot of valuable information on the problems of sign systems, symbolic description, hermeneutic method, etc. After the deportation of part of the artistic and research intelligentsia in 1922, A. F. Asmus, P. S. Popov, S. A. Yanovskaya, A. I. Vvedensky, N. O. Lossky, A. Bogdanov, A. Losev, M. Bakhtin, and G. G. Shpet remained and continued to work. The latter, in his work *'The Internal Form of the Word'* revealed and substantiated the Philosophy of Language as the basis of the Philosophy of Culture.

The discussion touched upon the problem of the interrelations between quality and quantity, interesting attempts were made to solve it through the problem of the category of causality, through the relationship between the abstract and the concrete, as well as from the point of view of the relationship between analytical and synthetic methods of cognition. Naturalists wrote about the importance of physicochemical and mathematical methods in the study of nature. V. F. Asmus (1894–1975) with his work *'Dialectical Materialism and Logic: An Outline of the Development of the Dialectical Method in Modern Philosophy from Kant to Lenin'* (Kyiv, 1924) actively turned on the discussed problems about the nature and specificity of philosophical knowledge. In 1928, he published an article on Kant's general and transcendental logic, and also, in the same year, with a review of A. Varyas' book *'Logic and Dialectics'*. *'Logic'* by Asmus published in 1947 clearly stood out from the line of books on non-mathematical logic, although it bore the distinct stamp of 'logical traditionalism'. E. K. Voishvillo, in his review of the book, noted "very major shortcomings", which included the lack of "criticism of idealistic perversions in logic", although he was supposed to "reveal the epistemological roots of certain idealistic errors in the interpretation of questions of logic". The fact is that Asmus tried to combine the traditional understanding of judgments with their interpretation in terms of relations, and the 'logic of relations' was sharply criticized. The 'Idealism' of this direction in logic was seen in the fact that in it the relations between objects are supposedly considered as something primary in comparison with the correlation of objective realities and their properties (predicates). A critical assessment of the logic of relations was justified — that's why both Voishvillo and Asmus took it up: it was a half-hearted attempt to overcome the untenable legacy of the philosophical logical tradition. In fact, such an overcoming has already been accomplished — as a result of the development of mathematical logic, especially in the form that Frege and Russell gave it. And both Russian philosophical logicians recognized this.

In Europe at that time, Wittgenstein's *'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'* (1921/22) was published, and Schlick's Vienna Circle entered the arena. The nature of human cognition and its relationship to reality becomes the center of philosophical discussions. In the *'Tractatus'*, the traditional epistemological problem of the relationship of knowledge (thinking) to reality remains basic, but is mediated by the study of the mechanisms of how language works. Thinking is equated to the meaningful use of language, thought to a meaningful sentence: instead of comparing thinking and reality, language and reality are compared. The main task is the development of a semantic theory of discursive knowledge, a theory of meaning, and the study of linguistic signs is declared to be the only means of objective knowledge of thinking. It became clear that Russell and Wittgenstein, in their logical-se-

mantic theory with its requirement for an unambiguous connection between the meaning of a sentence and the corresponding fact, proposed the same logical-linguistic doctrine in semantic terms [20, Introduction, ch. 1].

Beginning in the 1920s, intensive development of the theory of mathematical proof using the means and methods of mathematical logic began, which contributed to its development. The most outstanding mathematicians of the twentieth century took part in this work (D. Hilbert, K. Gödel, Y. P. Kolmogorov, P. S. Novikov, A. A. Markov, D. A. Bochvar, etc.). This was also facilitated by the publications by A. N. Whitehead, G. O. Weil, N. Bourbaki, D. Gilbert and W. Ackermann, D. Gilbert, A. Heyting, G. H. Hardy. These works have become part of philosophical education in our country. The subsequent development of mathematical logic led mathematicians and logicians to the conclusion that if some fairly rich theory is formalized in the logical calculus, then it cannot be completely reflected in this calculus (K. Gödel's theorem); when formalizing this kind of meaningful scientific theories, at each stage of logical formalization there remains an unidentified, unformalized remainder. According to S. A. Yanovskaya, this discrepancy between formalization and formalized content is a dialectical contradiction, which acts as an internal source of development of formal-logical means of science [21].

Domestic philosophers have learned that the rational meaning of realism in the philosophy of mathematics is the statement that the fundamental structures of mathematics are directly related to categorical ideas about reality, they seem to merge with ontology, absorb some aspects of categorical ideas, providing the corresponding concepts with the status of universality and intuitive clarity and a certain independence from the formal language of mathematics. So, arithmetical representations are organically related to some complex of categorical representations and, thus, have a status different from that of empirical representations, in addition to their logical organization. Means, different mathematical theories have different ontological status, they are meaningful in different ways, and in their intuitive basis they relate to different levels of ideas about reality. Likewise, the program of Logicism says that logic and mathematics as a whole reflect fundamentally different levels of ideas about reality and, because of this, cannot be reduced to each other. But this does not exclude the fact that, from the very beginning, individual mathematical concepts are oriented not on empirical, but on categorical representations and in this sense are akin to logical concepts. Realism in this case provides some justification for the attempts of logicists to reduce the concepts of arithmetic and set theory to logical relations. And finally, realism in the philosophy of mathematics is closely related to traditional apriorism. Both of these directions of thinking proceed from the fact of the special intuitive clarity of mathematical images, with the difference that realism seeks to explain this fact not from the properties of the mind, but from the relationship of these images to some objective entities. The rational point of both of these views is that they capture the connection between fundamental mathematical concepts and categorical ideas about the world, which is completely ignored by both empiricist and formalist philosophy of mathematics.

The time required to perceive Logical Positivism, in addition to the accompanying knowledge in logic and mathematics, was the shortest. Only in 1934, did Ernst Kohlman (1892–1979), in his work *'The Subject and Method of Modern Mathematics'*, analyze Logicism and Positivism from a Marxist position. Logistics, according to Kohlman, considers its statements not to be reflections of reality, but to be unconditional truths that do not need to be supported by experience and cannot be refuted by it. Mathematics forms its

concepts purely logically and constructs its proofs using purely logical methods. This goes back to Leibniz (1671), who "dreamed of creating universal symbolism, of the mechanization of thinking". But only in the end of the nineteenth century did Dedekind (1888), Frege (1893), Peano (1895) develop logical symbolism to such an extent that it was possible to give a logical analysis of the concept of number and show the sufficiency of the five axioms to justify the arithmetic of natural numbers [9, p. 285]. Subsequently, Russell (1903), and then with him Whitehead (1910), set out logistics as a complete discipline [22, p. 258].

The means of logistics is its symbolism: having constructed the calculus of sentences, then logical functions and logical classes, logisticians move on to constructing systems of axioms for natural numbers. Each of the logisticians, Peano, Padoa, Couture, Burali-Forti, and Russell, used their own symbolism. The very attempt to create an algebra of logic does not yet mean a separation from reality, nor the transformation of truths into something amorphous and incomprehensible [9, p. 285]. It was only because the logisticians tried to reduce arithmetic to logic, and understood logic metaphysically, that the work of the logisticians failed only because of their idealistic methodology. True, logistics managed, according to Kohlman, "to create precise logical symbolism as an important tool for scientific research and, with its help, to identify the logical structure of mathematical concepts and mathematical proofs" [22, p. 297].

The problem of language

Domestic scientists noted that in logic problems of language come to the fore. The created and developing symbolic logic made language a special subject of logical research. At the same time, attention to language in logic is intertwined with the construction of artificial logical calculi and the analysis of the language of science. However, the logical approach to the problem of studying signs led to the formation of logical semantics, along with semantics as a logical discipline. It is already studying the semantic rules for the transition from formalized syntactic systems to interpreted semantic systems, i. e. is busy establishing correspondence between the elements of a logical system and a specific subject area. The problems of semantics are interconnected with the theory of knowledge and philosophical worldview. In this case, the meaning of signs includes their relation to objects, to other signs, to people using language. The solution to these questions is based on certain general philosophical premises, on which the solution to specific problems ultimately depends. So, traditional semantics already contained important philosophical points. The study of scientific language in terms of logical semantics is intertwined with a whole complex of epistemological issues, in particular traditional questions of the theory of knowledge, but presented in a new way in terms of language [23, p. 8–12].

Logical-epistemological interest in the problems of semantics was caused by the formalization of science, logical-mathematical analysis of knowledge, and the problem of interpreting sign dependencies. Mathematical thinking at a new stage required studying the problem of meaning in mathematics itself. The development of axiomatic and the construction of deductive theories in a purely logical way posed the philosophical problem of mathematical existence, the relation of mathematical theories to reality. Thus, special requirements were placed on the analysis of scientific knowledge. The identification of acute

logical contradictions in mathematics itself became the reason for the logical analysis of the foundations of mathematics and attention to the logical analysis of scientific language. The loss of connection between mental content and the objective content of things required the interpretation of sign systems.

Thus, the change in Russell's semantic concept was associated with the theory of descriptions, which destroyed his previous conceptual scheme. As a result, the essential concepts of philosophy itself were revised. Fact becomes the constructive recipient of such a significant judgment for that time. Now the objective world has two tiers (the one that exists in space and time, and the other that has not existence, but being), but only one — the tier of facts. Speaking on this point, Quine believed that Russell's commitment to the ontology of facts was determined by a confusion of meaning and reference, which cannot be agreed upon. Since the new semantic concept assumed that the meaning is not limited to one denotation. The question of understanding linguistic constructions, which is relevant for analysis in the field of intersubjectivity, forces Russell to define meaning not as an object to which a word or sentence is linked, but as the very relationship between a sign and an object. This definability of meaning is very similar to Frege's concept of meaning, which is equated to a specific reflection of the way an object is represented by a sign [24, p. 502–555]. But, in this way, along with the denotation, another semantic characteristic is introduced that is not identified with it. The essence of the transformation of semantic theory was that from two-level semantics, in which all linguistic expressions are considered as names, there was a transition to three-level semantics, when, in addition to linguistic expressions and their denotations, a third semantic level is introduced — the level of meanings, or senses.

The problem of the meaning of signs is quite multifaceted and, for its solution, relies on the study of a number of theoretical concepts: sign, symbol, meaning, communication, interpretation [25; 26]. It turned out that any problem must be formulated in language. A special field of study emerges — the philosophy of language. Often interest in these problems leads to emphasizing certain aspects of meaning, sign, language. Formalist, conceptualist, and realist theories of meaning speak about this. In the theory of knowledge, the realist view was supported by Plato, Hegel, Husserl's Logicism, Moore and Russell's 'Neorealism', and later by American 'Critical Realism' and the realistic semantics of individual symbolic logicians. The general thesis here is this: meaning is a real entity, independent of human thinking, and also an identification, to one degree or another, of thinking and being. In the logical-linguistic approach to philosophy, all philosophical problems are given a linguistic character, and the subject of philosophy is declared to be the logical analysis of the proposals of science and everyday language. Moritz Schlick believed that "science should be defined as the "search for truth", and philosophy as the "search for meaning" [27, S. 739].

In 1936, D. Yu. Kvitko devotes several pages to the analytical method, discussing mainly the idea of causality [28]. In the 1930s, Logical Positivism and Logicism are repeatedly mentioned in the mathematical works of D. A. Bochvara, P. S. Alexandrova, S. A. Yanovskaya, and others. At this time, the tasks of cognition are reduced to the description of sensory data in its relationships, without correlating knowledge with objective reality. Positivism linked its epistemological program with the concept of 'pure' Empiricism, with the principle of the 'immediately given'. Extra-empirical concepts and ideas of science, not reducible to the sensory experience of the subject, are regarded as groundless 'metaphysics'. This also includes the recognition of the existence of the

external world. The logical-linguistic approach to philosophical problems becomes predominant among logical positivists. The world of things is accepted as a concrete form of language. And the point is no longer a problem of sensory observations, but we are talking about facts recorded in atomic, protocol and similar sentences. "Knowledge outside of logical forms is something completely different from the knowledge of existing things" [29, p. 52]. In other words, the task of philosophy is associated with logical analysis, which does not involve a real study of the objects themselves. Thus, intralogical, intralinguistic analysis of knowledge becomes a new way of isolating knowledge from objective reality, which expresses the subjective-idealistic essence of any positivism [20, p. 141–142].

Logical analysis

Philosophy is considered a logical method of clarifying propositions by analyzing their logical forms. Logical analysis distinguishes empirical, factual, descriptive statements within science, and, on the other hand, analytical statements of logic and mathematics that have only a formal meaning. The first provide all the information content of science. The latter form the logical framework, the 'scaffolding' of knowledge. They indicate acceptable ways in the language of reorganizing some sentences into others; in fact, these are tautologies and do not carry meaningful information. Supporters of Logical Positivism considered such a Wittgensteinian interpretation of logic to be a great merit of the philosopher. In this case, philosophical positions are not included in either the first or second groups of analysis and are regarded as meaningless. The significance of analytical philosophy and the passion of many philosophers for its problems, the development of views from Realism to Neorealism: all this led to the fact that the tasks of the domestic study of analytical philosophy became urgent. Logicians, mathematicians and a large group of Soviet philosophers contributed to the assimilation of the positive achievements of analytical philosophy in Russian philosophy; among them A. F. Begiashvili, A. S. Bogomolov, A. A. Vetrov, A. F. Gryaznov, G. A. Zaichenko, A. A. Zinoviev, M. S. Kozlova, E. E. Lednikov, Yu. K. Melville, I. S. Narsky, A. V. Panin, M. V. Popovich, L. O. Reznikov, V. A. Surovtsev, V. S. Shvyrev, and others. The translation of the main works of the classics of analytical philosophy expanded the possibilities for the development of the identified problems of the theory of knowledge. The contribution of I. S. Narsky remains important up today; he gave brief and succinct characteristics of the formation of analytical philosophy in its various variants. He correctly noted that "logical problematics, no matter how they are 'developed' towards epistemology, are not able to replace the entire complex of theoretical-cognitive problems" [13]. A. F. Gryaznov carried out detailed work in the development of analysis [30]. Let us note the work by N. A. Blokhina, who showed the connection between analysts and passion for metaphysics [31]. *'Anatomy of Logic'* by V. A. Surovtsev [32] also deserves attention as well as the monograph by S. V. Nikonenko [33].

Of course, various problems of analytical philosophy and the views of its main theorists were covered unevenly in the literature; more often they wrote about B. Russell and L. Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, Popper, Carnap, and Ayer. The important thing is that it was in the vein of analytical philosophy and its derivatives that very topical problems were developed not only in logic and mathematics, but in the philosophy of science and the theory of knowledge. Obvious scientific results were obtained. Mastering them con-

tributed to the development of theoretical-cognitive problems. Over time, the philosophical program of Logical Positivism lost its position and convincingly showed the falsity of empiric-positivist principles.

In the 1950s, analysts are viewed as subjective idealists, while the roots of subjectivism lie in fundamental epistemological principles, and not in specific ways of their implementation. At the same time, we note the high role of V. F. Asmus in popularizing the ideas of analytical philosophy in the introductory article to L. Wittgenstein's *'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'* (1958). Only at the end of the 1950s, works began to appear that reflected the true situation in the field of logic and mathematics [10; 34]. The assessment of analytical philosophy was helped by translations of B. Russell's works *'Human Knowledge'* (1957) [10] and *'History of Western Philosophy'* (1959) [35]. Previously, any objective study of analytical philosophy was essentially an attack against sweeping criticism. In the introductory article to *'Human Knowledge'*, E. Kohlman gives a balanced assessment of the work of B. Russell [10, p. 6].

According to Russell, to justify scientific conclusions, some 'minimal principles' must lie. The task is to establish these non-experiential and non-logical principles of knowledge. He turns to individual and social experience, to the role of the sensory and logical aspects of cognition, analyzes the concepts of science and the likelihood of assessing the reliability of scientific knowledge. Only after this are principles supposedly prior to experience established, and knowledge declared to be merely a 'deceptive illusion'. 'The world of science', like the 'ordinary world', is a construction that is partly scientific and partly pre-scientific [10, p. 42]. The world is constructed by humanity. There is an identification of the subjective with the individual-sensual, the objective with 'social experience'. Further analysis of language, the relations between knowledge and faith, ways of knowing based on our sensations and other problems are presented based on the "conclusions of ordinary common sense". So it is impossible to establish the difference between the physical world and the world of consciousness. His 'naive materialism' does not allow one to eliminate 'inconvenient' concepts such as 'causal law', 'substance', etc. By interpreting 'knowledge' purely subjectively, as personal experience, Russell has no difficulty in 'proving' its unreliability. Postulates of scientific conclusion, the reliability of which he is convinced of, but cannot prove, although he considers them "prerequisites of the theory of knowledge" [10, p. 529], since "all human knowledge is unreliable, inaccurate and partial". This is the real essence of analytical philosophy.

References

1. Russell, B. (1913), Recent work on the principles of mathematics, in: *New ideas in mathematics*. Sat. 1. Method, problems and its significance, St. Petersburg, pp. 322–339. (In Russian)

2 Dedekind, R. (1905), *What are numbers and what do they serve*, Kazan. (In Russian)

3. Poincaré, A. (1910), *Science and Method*, Odessa. (In Russian)

4. Cassirer, E. (1912), *Cognition and Reality: The concept of substance and the concept of function,* St. Petersburg. (In Russian)

5. Whitehead, A. N. (1916), *Introduction to Mathematics*, Petrograd. (In Russian)

6. Rössel, B. (1914), *Problems of Philosophy*, St. Petersburg: Izdatel'skii dom P. P. Soikina Publ. (In Russian)

7. Blonsky, P. P. (1918), *History of philosophy*, in 2 parts, part 1, Moscow: Russian scribe. (In Russian)

8. Kolesnikov, A. S. (2021), The Creative Work of Bertrand Russell in Russia", *Journal of Philosophy and Ethics*, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 9–18.

9. Kolesnikov, A. S. (2020), Bertrand Russell in Russia, *Vestnik RHGA*, vol. 21, iss. 3. pp. 275–288. (In Russian)

10. Russell, B. (1957), *Human Cognition. Its spheres and boundaries*, Moscow: IL Publ. (In Russian)

11. Sheptulin, A. P. (1975), Criticism of some theories of modern bourgeois philosophy on the issue of the relationship between the individual and the general, in: *Critique of Modern Bourgeois Philosophy in the Course of Dialectical Materialis*m, Moscow: Vysshaia shkola Publ., pp. 111–121. (In Russian)

12. Lednikov, E. E. (1973), *A critical analysis of nominalistic and platonist tendencies in modern logic*, Kyiv: Naukova Dumka Publ., pp. 29–35. (In Russian)

13. Narsky, I. S. (1961), *Modern positivism. Critical Essays*, Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR Publ. (In Russian)

14. Smirnova, E. D. (1967), Semantics in logic, in: *Logical semantics and modal logic*, Moscow: Nauka Publ., pp. 3–54. (In Russian)

15. Levin, G. D. (1987), *Dialectical-materialist theory of the universal*, Moscow: Nauka Publ. (In Russian)

16. Davydov, V. V. (1972), *Types of generalization and learning*, Moscow: Vysshaia shkola Publ. (In Russian)

17. Ilyenkov, E. V. (1960), *Dialectics of abstract and concrete in scientific and theoretical thinking*, Moscow: Institut filosofii AN SSSR Publ., pp. 55–71. (In Russian)

18. Holden, B. and Russel, B. (1926), *Daedalus and Icarus* (The Future of Science), Leningrad and Moscow: Petrograd Publ. (In Russian)

19. Alekseev, P. V. (comp.) (1990), *At the turning point: philosophical discussions of the 20s*: *Philosophy and worldview*, Moscow: Politizdat Publ. (In Russian)

20. Kozlova, M. S. (1972), *Philosophy and Language*, Moscow: Mysl' Publ. (In Russian)

21. Yanovskaya, S. A (1963), On philosophical problems of mathematical logic, in: *Problems of Logic*, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo akademii nauk SSSR Publ., pp. 3–17. (In Russian)

22. Kohlman, E. (1934), *Subject and method of modern mathematics*, Moscow and Leningrad: Gosizdat Publ. (In Russian)

23. Anokhin, A. M. and Vvedenskaya, T. E. (2015), The language of science and personal knowledge: problems of semantic accuracy, *Society: philosophy, history, culture*, no. 4, pp. 8–12. (In Russian)

24. Biryukov, B. V. (1960), Gottlob Frege's Theory of Meaning, in: *Application of Logic in Science and Technology*, Moscow: Nauka Publ., pp. 502–555. (In Russian)

25. Mantatov, V. V. (1980), *Image, sign, convention*, Moscow: Vysshaia shkola Publ. (In Russian)

26. Petrov, V. V. (1979), *Structures of meaning. Logical analysis*, Novosibirsk: Nauka Publ. (In Russian)

27. Schlick, M. (1918), *Allgemeine Erknntnislehre*, Berlin: Springer.

28. Kvitko, D. Yu. (1936), *Essays in Modern Anglo-American Philosophy*, Moscow: Nauka Publ. (In Russian)

29. Russell, B. (1952), *Our knowledge of the external world as a field for Scientific Method in Philosophy*, London: Allen & Unwin.

30. Gryaznov, A. F. (2006), *Analytic Philosophy,* Moscow: Vysshaia shkola Publ. (In Russian)

31. Blokhina, N. A. (2011), *Metaphysics in Analytical Philosophy: Essays on History*, Ryazan: RGU Publ. (In Russian)

32. Surovtsev, V. A. (2001), *The Anatomy of Logic: The Sources, Genesis and System of Early Wittgenstein's Philosophy,* Tomsk: Izdatel'stvo Tomskogo universiteta Publ. (In Russian)

33. Nikonenko, S. V. (2007) *Analytical Philosophy: Basic Concepts*, St. Petersburg University Press. (In Russian)

34 Getmanova, A. D. (1959), On Bertrand Russell's views on the relationship between mathematics and logic, *Bulletin of Moscow State University*, no. 11, pp. 103–123. (In Russian)

35. Russell, B. (1959), *History of Western Philosophy*. Moscow: IL Publ. (In Russian)

Received: April 2, 2024
Accepted: September 16, 2024

Author's information:

Anatoly S. Kolesnikov — Dr. Sci. in Philosophy, Professor; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3493-1829, a.kolesnikov@spbu.ru

Аналитическая философия на российской сцене. Адаптация и развитие (1913–1959)*

А. С. Колесников

Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет,
Российская Федерация, 199034, Санкт-Петербург, Университетская наб., 7–9

Для цитирования: *Kolesnikov A. S.* Analytical Philosophy on the Russian Stage. Adaptation and Development (1913–1959) // Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Философия и конфликтология. 2024. Т. 40. Вып. 4. С. 582–594. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2024.402

Статья раскрывает особенности адаптации и развития аналитической философии на российской сцене в период с 1913–1959 гг. Ученые и философы были знакомы с первым и вторым позитивизмом, а с аналитической философией знакомство было опосредовано новейшими работами в логике и математике, сведением математики к логике, а логики — к философии. Знаковыми были публикации работ Рассела «Проблемы философии» и «Трактата» Витгенштейна, суждения о чувственных данных как основе нового реализма, роли языка, знака, семантики и искусственных языков в познании мира. Показано, что именно в русле аналитической философии отечественные мыслители разрабатывали весьма актуальные проблемы логики и математики, философии науки и теории познания; проблему универсалий, актуальность которой связана с идеей соответствия структуры языка и структуры мира; семантическую теорию дискурсивного знания, теории значения, ибо изучение языковых знаков объявляется единственным средством объективного познания мышления. Отечественные философы усвоили, что рациональный смысл реализма в философии математики состоит в утверждении: фундаментальные структуры математики имеют непосредственное отношение к категориальным представлениям о реальности, они как бы смыкаются с онтологией, вбирают в себя некоторые аспекты категориальных представлений, обеспечивая соответствующим понятиям статус универсальности, интуитивной ясности и определенной независимости от формального языка математики. Советские ученые отметили, что в логике на передний план выходят проблемы языка. При этом внимание к языку в логике переплетается с построением искусственных логических исчислений и анализом языка науки, его формализации, логико-математического анализа знания, проблемой интерпретации знаковых зависимостей. В философской литературе 1950-х годов постепенно складывается облик представителей аналитической философии как субъективных идеалистов, при этом корни субъективизма кроются в фундаментальных гносеологических принципах, а не в конкретных способах их реализации.

Ключевые слова: эмпиризм, реализм, логический позитивизм, аналитическая философия, Рассел, Витгенштейн, философия языка, проблемы универсалий.

Статья поступила в редакцию 2 апреля 2024 г.;
рекомендована к печати 16 сентября 2024 г.

Контактная информация:

Колесников Анатолий Сергеевич — д-р филос. наук, проф.; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3493-1829, a.kolesnikov@spbu.ru

* Исследование выполнено за счет гранта Российского научного фонда № 24-28-00295, https://rscf.ru/project/24-28-00295/; Русская христианская гуманитарная академия им. Ф. М. Достоевского.