Mutual recognition:
A dialogue between Italian and Russian perspectives*

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The knowledge and understanding of kaleidoscopic and hypermodern societies rely heavily on the term “recognition.” This term carried a great deal of significance in the Russian philosophical tradition, but attracts less attention now. The main purpose of this paper is to offer a contribution to the discussion on this topic, by considering both the Russian and the European philosophical traditions, with specific reference to the Italian perspective. The methodological focus is concerned with the two essential aspects of recognition: that of the interpersonal and that of the group. Our philosophical analysis of recognition endeavors to take into account first and foremost the problematic field of Otherness. The process of recognition of the Other is thus considered according to three stages of approval: cognitive, moral and social. Cognitive approval includes the identification of the Other as opposite to the group as well as to each individual. The moral stage contemplates concretization of social objectives and accepting the Other as a whole that should above all be respected and accepted. At the stage of social approval, the individual is being recognized within the social context of a group (closed social group) as recognition or rejection. Specifying the recognition leads to a reduction in the number of conflicts, the clarification of borders, and the acceptance of Otherness as an element of individuality. The contribution to the theory of recognition here outlined is new to the Russian scientific context, and may prove challenging in the context of Russian-Italian dialogue. It also constitutes an attempt to compare the common representations of Otherness with current theoretical developments. The theory is illustrated by analysis of closed social groups functioning as a promising series of case studies, in order to open up a renewed interest in research into social reality theories in both Russian and Italian contexts.

Keywords: recognition, acceptance, Other, identity, closed social groups.

Premise. Recognition in Russian Philosophy and Culture

In this paper, we carry out the philosophical analysis of the concept of recognition in the contexts of post-structuralism. First, we provide an overview of the evolution of the...
term “recognition” in the European philosophical tradition. After that, the comparison between Western approaches and the studies on recognition in Russia is made. The major part of the paper contains the theory of three stages of recognition as the result of the international philosophical dialogue. We test our method according to the current social reality and illustrate each stage with examples of closed social groups.

The category of “recognition” at the current moment is not very popular in Russian research ethics and social philosophy fields, whereas it is currently central in the fast moving world of hypermodern. Contemporary reflection of the theme in the European philosophical tradition has grown in its intensity. The description of the concept in general was improved, the elaboration arose and derivations were developed.

Identity and recognition traditionally were researched both in the “neoHegelianist” context [1, p. 23] (proper in Hegel philosophy and his French followers in XX century A. Kojève and J. P. Sartre) and in the “intersubjective” interpretation of P. Ricoeur. In the Russian philosophical tradition the concept of recognition usually was understood as acceptance. In the process of recognition, a large part is taken by the sense of perception. As Russian philosophy has such an ethical and religious nature, the issue of recognition is treated by Russian philosophy as an individual act. That also means that the aim of the recognition lies inside the person, even if the subject of the recognition is another person, it should be accepted inside of the one who is recognizing.

The first person who brought up the problem of recognition in Russian philosophy was Nikolay Fedorov. As an advocate of cosmism theory, he insisted on the necessity of recognizing each person who lives or lived on the planet, the so-called “recognition without exception” [2]. Fedorov’s research on psychocracy was formed as a doctrine about the proper realization of religious heists: “the one God’s son doctrine… calls all the people to recognize themselves as the sons of all dead fathers, grand sire, ancestors. Such understanding is a history without exceptions, without the people who are not worth remembering…” [3, p. 94].

Contemporary Russian scholar F. Devyatkin explains that through our involvement in society, there is a common consanguinity. He also notes that there is an ability to include the Other in an understanding of yourself and to develop yourself in the way he or she is possible as a being [2]. The recognition in Fedorov’s theory of Recognition, in this case implies not only acceptance of the whole history in the person, but also acceptance of including the person into the whole historical process. After recognizing the Others (both dead and alive), humanity implies this construction in itself. This allows it to expose and, at the same time, to understand itself. To reach it, the individual and humanity in general need to reproduce themselves from the elementary components. Fedorov also underlines that it is necessary to reproduce humanity neither as a model nor as a short or simplified version of itself, but through individualities, in all its complexity.

The recognition without exceptions can also be illustrated with the extensional theory of P. Florensky, who claims that we could not exclude a thing from its surroundings. During the perception of it we need to take into account the corresponding reality [4]. Thus, to recognize a thing, it is necessary to include perception of it in one’s mind. This principle allows us to express that recognition without exceptions is not only morally imperative, but also the condition of the existence of a single human being.

We can find another concept of recognition in the erotic theory of N. Berdyaev. He divides the love into three types, the first and the second of which are mostly common,
love as Care and love as Eros. The difference is in the attitude to the object of love. Love as Care is love that goes down to its object, while the love as Eros exalts it. The love as Eros sees the Other that is loved in God’s eyes and sees the beauty of the beloved. The compassionate love sees the Other in god-forsakenness, in the darkness of the world, in suffering and in ugliness [5]. However, both of these types of love could not be accepted as the true ones from Berdyaev’s point of view. The love as Eros in its extreme limits the freedom of the Other, as well as the freedom of the lover. But love as Care is not better for the personality. True love is the love in oeuvre, as it is an oeuvre (according to Berdyaev) that you see in your favourite one the image of God. This oeuvre-love is the love of Christ, where the lover needs to recognize their beloved as a brother or a sister in the celestial father. This recognition allows them to understand the personality of the beloved and feel the mystical insight of the Other. Again, we have here the concept of recognition as including the perception of the Other in recognising the mentality of personality, feeling, sympathy, and acceptance of the Other in itself.

The most comprehensive research on the current term in Russian philosophy was conducted by I. Ilyin. He contemplated recognition in the stream of law theory. Recognition (priznanie) here is, once again, closer to the acceptance in English, to recognize the subject matter of the legal awareness, the recognition should come “from the conscientiae,” but not “from the fear” [6]. The philosopher distinguished the free sense of law from the slave’s understanding of it. The servile understanding implies “considering” (priznati) the law. Ilyin claims that if person has such a type of understanding of the law, they would delinquental the rule first; they have the opportunity to do it. Sense of the law, for this person has stopped on external legacy. The understanding of the law as the external rule remains immature according to Ilyin. Such a sense of the law will motivate the slave to seek egress or speculation possibilities. Recognition from fear results in obeying the law, but does not accept it. The slave would divide the world into friend-and-foe and try to realize all covered motives beside the edges. While the main principle of the law in Ilyin’s understanding is Justice (and equality, as the main part of the concept of justice). Only recognition of the law “from conscientiae” [6], the free Recognition is not humiliating, it should find the reason of itself in a person’s will. This Recognition, as Ilyin states, can arise only from free will or will that is self-respectful. Thus, the recognition in Ilyin’s law theory is again based on irrational understanding, on the comprehension of the phenomenon in general and including this understanding in the concept of living. The Ilyin law theory claims to recognize the law subjectively, intentionally, while the law tradition is a tradition of objective rules. The rules are created by other people and reinforced by the external power. However, while the rules are external, Ilyin says that the perception of the idea of law should come from the person himself [6].

Russian philosophers had not paid much attention to the term recognition, which often occurs in texts, but had not been examined. Recognition (priznanie) in most ways is understood as acceptance (prinyatie) and brought in the ethical context, and the meaning of it is traditionally orthodox. This theory is confirmed in those few pieces, where the term is explained. Modern Russian researcher V. Melas explains recognition as “joining a group, that recognizes you back. However, the size and the structure of the group, as well as the motives of its members, remains unconcerned and the act of joining usually is non-conscious” [7, p. 200]. Ricoeur is the starting point for his own independent research on the contemporary human in the situation of acceptance. “It is important that recognition
is not a language game, but the way of existence, based on offering help and on expectation for support” [7, p. 210]. The point of the recognition, in comparison to openly joining a group, is that in the first situation the motives and structure of the group are usually unknown and anonymity gives rise to the sensation of veracity, whereas the recognition is pretending to be acknowledgment.

In the Russian language the English term “recognition” for a long time corresponded to the outmoded priyatie [acceptance], while vospriyatie [perception] is a combination of the word root of “acceptance” and the prefix “in-“, which points out that recognition in Russian tradition, implies vpushchenie [admission] in the close inner circle. Etymologically the Russian understanding of recognition developed in the opposite way, compared to the European term: from inclusion in the group to enquiring-accepting-understanding the Other.¹

Recognition in Western Philosophy. A comprehensive view

The first formulation of the problem can be found in the source of all Western philosophy. It was Aristotle who was the first most considerate and observing researcher of the recognition phenomenon. He was especially interested in the functioning of recognition in the context of tragedy narration construction. In The Poetics [8], recognition-ignorance² [anagnorisis] is a mutation (as an evolution) from total nescience to comprehension. This comprehension results in amicability or animosity towards the individual, destined to success or lack of success by destiny.

The classical theory was introduced by Hegel and developed by Charles Taylor and Alex Honnet. That said, in a chronological sequence of the thoughts that specify the usage of the word reconnaissance (remarked with a stamp of philosophical questioning), Kantian recognitio has an antecedence to Bergson's reconnaissance and Hegel's anerkennung [9, p. 26]. Thus, Kant’s recognitio theory is superior in special function of the theoretical field to this concept. Also based on the Kantian theory, Paul Ricoeur discovered the self-identity element in the recognition process [9, p. 41]. Descartes and Kant explain recognition as identification, to apprehend the meaning singleness in spirit. The category of recognition at first upgraded to the rank of philosopheme in the Critique, it is understood as recognition but in the form of anagnorisis or identification where the recognition could not be distinguished from acknowledgement.

The first sure steps of the philosophy of recognition is connected to the enlargement of human rights and regarded in two notions, “recognition of the rights of somebody and

¹ It is also interesting that the adjective of priyatie [acceptance] — priyatnyj [pleasant, gratifying] in the contemporary Russian language brought important, and, from now, a single meaning in the linguistic base of recognition: to be gratifying. While the number of cognate words nepriyatie — negative noun meaning ‘rejection’ and nepriyatnyj — negative adjective meaning ‘unpleasant’ barely could be interpreted in the wrong way.

² Recognition as the name indicates is a change from ignorance to knowledge, producing love or hate between the persons destined by the poet for good or bad fortune. The best form of recognition is coincident with the reversal of intention as in Oedipus. There are indeed three other forms. Even inanimate things of the most trivial kind may sometimes be an object of recognition. Again we can recognise or discover whether a person has done a thing or not. But the recognition that is most intimately connected with a plot and action is, as we have said, the recognition of persons. This recognition, combined with a reversal will produce either pity or fear; and actions, producing this affect on those, who by our definition, tragedy represents. Moreover, it is upon such a situation that the issues of good or bad fortune will depend.
for something” [9, p. 59] (the rights of an individual, designated by its subject matter and attribution of these rights for the new categories of individuals or groups). The permanent conversion to the phenomenon of recognition (nearly from the middle of the 1980s) can mark the necessity of specification or redefinition of the category by composition of the so called “argumentum bank”. The formed recognition theory connects the phenomenon with the ability to intercommunicate and the ability to act. The theme of recognition itself has a tendency to be more of frequent occurrence. The point is that in a “multicultural society” there is a specific field of problems, with the lack of a concrete base and objective argumentation. In Western theoretical philosophy, discussion of the problem had several directions and obtained some updated information.

The structuralistic understanding of Recognition was centred on the results of anthropological research, such as recognition based on the binary opposition “us-them” of Levi-Strauss [10]. Due to this opposition the concept of identity, of otherness is created, to recognise here is to add the Other into any of these groups. Thus, a common understanding of the recognition is based on anthropological constructions. However, this treatment does not correspond with reality. Identity of the individual in contemporary society is found in the interrelation between the individual and social groups. Moreover, these groups are not as autonomous as traditional tribes. What we are proposing now is a modern view, based on the understanding of Otherness through identity. Italian colleges propose that we define different types of identities and specify how the recognition is possible in each case.

**Mutual recognition, between personal identity and models of otherness:**

**An Italian point of view**

The modern era is increasingly being shaped by an intense albeit frequently unequal awareness of difference, diversity, and of otherness. This is undoubtedly one of the most significant effects of the comprehensive processes that we implied by the label of globalization. However, the perception at close quarters of which, *prima facie*, may appear to us to be incommensurably distant in ethical, cultural, and political terms produces contextually a renewed confirmation of the need to define (and re-define) ourselves. An important part of the “identity question,” certainly one of the key-concepts of the global age, is contained in this context.

An intuitive picture of the pair of concepts identity-otherness (or identity-alterity) invites us to think of the first concept in opposition to the second. If one were to stress this polarity, it might be expressed in these terms: either I take care of myself (*the path of identity*) or I take care of others (*the path of otherness*). Within this scheme, there is no authentic and autonomous way of identity that does not exclude others.

In this context we will try to show that, from a phenomenological, pragmatic, and normative perspective, it is impossible to conceive and, above all, to actually live any identitarian path that cannot be described as other-including, and therefore implicitly or explicitly, that does not recognise the existence of the other, precisely in order to shape the definition of what the individual can be and wants to be. As we’ll explore in this and in the
following paragraphs, this way of framing the issue explicitly envisages the necessity to re-
visit the issue of the concept of recognition and the possible levels of its own articulation.

In addressing the “identity question,” we will begin by considering its natural negati-
vum, i.e. the concept of otherness. This approach may seem odd, but our aim is to begin
to destabilise the notion of otherness in order to re-introduce it into the individual’s self-
understanding. In particular, we will begin by outlining three forms of otherness, each of
which is intended as an ideal-type and, as we will show in the following section, each of
which bears a corresponding relation to individual identity and to the mutual recognition
between the self and the other.

The first contour of otherness already can be qualified as wall-otherness. Phenomeno-
logically speaking, this contour of otherness precedes any other one. That is to say, the
Other is ascertained, at first as the edge, or barrier, that prevents our will and our power to
act. In this first modality, the Other is defined as alien, dissonant, and opposite. The second
contour of Otherness could be named as the mirror-otherness. The Other is perceived first
of all as somebody who recognizes us because of our similarity (we mutually recognize
each other). Our life pattern, value system and purposes of coexisting could be shared
with this type of Other. This Other is a euphonic Other (similar to a consonant letter) with
values along similar lines to ours. The third contour is the door-otherness, echoing what
George Simmel introduced in “The Bridge and the Door” [12]. The door represents a radical
way to distinguish, as well as to unite, and it is two sides of the same coin of unity and
differentiation. The Otherness of medium unification means that it determines both the
duality and the individuality. This contour of Otherness allows us to sum up the subtotals.

All three kinds of Otherness enable us to address the question of identity, to answer
the question “Who am I?” The first contour answers the question ex contrario (“I am not
the Other”; “I am against the Other”). The second contour implies a convergent type of
answer, what we could call ex harmony (“I am the same as the Other”). The third contour
provides for including the Other into our group. Thus, the answer here to the question
“Who am I?” is the process (I am with and through the Other). The way we formulate the
experience of ourselves through the procedure resembles the process of development of
Hegel’s dialectics (thesis-antithesis-synthesis) [13].

Based on these three contours of Otherness we can distinguish at least two corre-
spounding types of identity: the misrecognising identity and the recognising identity. The
first concerns the wall and mirror forms of otherness. The identity corresponding to these
two forms of otherness is one that for the most part misrecognises, or is insufficiently
aware of the existence of the other within its own experiential and practical field. But the
misrecognition involved is also distorting, for it involves not only a partial awareness of
the Other, but also a partial (and in some cases only occasional) respect for them — some-
thing that is particularly significant at the ethical-political level. In turn, the recognising
identity can be understood accordingly with the third form of Otherness, the door-othen-
ness. The recognising identity is therefore that identity which is aware of the unexpected
opportunity for enrichment that any interaction with the other offers, of the fact that — in
a relation between subjects who see themselves reciprocally as free and equal — what is
gained from such interaction is greater than any possible loss in terms of self-presentation.
Such identity, one might say, “takes the other seriously” because it “takes itself seriously,”
in the awareness that the self exists only in the constant hermeneutic process that simul-
taneously connects it and distinguishes it from every other that it meets on its path [14; 15].
Framing the issue in this perspective, the definition of recognition requires new examples, as is surely offered by the closed social groups theory (office groups, neighbours in communal flats, nationalist groups)\textsuperscript{4}. Insofar as CSG has several characteristics specific to traditional tribes, the process of recognition is closely related to the blurring of distinction. Each successive stage allows us to negotiate previous restrictions. These freely organised groups function within the framework of the contemporary society, and are free to communicate with external social units (such as other individuals and CSG). However, they partly preserve features of a closed socium, such as a limited number of members, hierarchy inside the group structure, and a specific language. These are the CSG that have the greatest influence on the individual. Social networks in these groups are strong and stable, so the “microclimate” is carefully preserved by the group’s members from the influence of the Other. The cases from different spheres of life are held here as examples: neighbours in cohabiting groups (daily and private life), nationalistic society (commonality of world view), and office groupings (career).

**The process of recognition**

It might appear challenging to “enable” a concept of recognition that can be brought into dialogue with the Russian perspective that was presented above (and which will be further developed below) and, at the same time is capable of being “tuned” with the three models of Otherness just outlined. Let us summarize in this context at least three levels of recognition which have been articulated elsewhere in more detail [11, p. 77–99, 119–187].

The first level could be framed through the expression of *ascertain the Other*. The aim of this phenomenologically evident level of recognition is an attempt to answer the questions related to the *principium identificationis*: “Who is it/What is it?” This level regards a sort of basic epistemology, that is achieved by identification of the Other as “something” that comes into contact with us according to the phenomenological way. This way implies the ability to identify the Other both as an object in empirical perception and as a being acting in a certain way that, in fact, I can “recognize” as its own.

In turn, the second level could be indicated as *accepting the Other*. The acceptance stage has two main vectors, the *acceptance* of the Other by the whole group, and *acceptance* of the group by the Other. The concept of the acceptance, based on the structuralistic duality of friend-or-foe, refers to the multiple forms of the Other’s inclusion in society, and from the very beginning potentially conflicting social contexts. However, for the current social situation it is ordinary to precept the group homogeneously, individuals who are not self or the same, by the roles inside the group or in exterior situations of contact. Thus, the group as a social actor exists only in the individual’s perception, in the perception of Other. Relevant to the context of the contemporary world, representation of the recognition process proposes such phenomenon as hetero-acceptation. We will go into more details about this point.

*Prima facie*, by addressing the sphere of the *acceptance* phenomenon one may be understood as referring to the concept of tolerance (lat. *tolero* — sustain the burden). Rather, the *acceptance of the Other* concerns everything that can be qualified as its admission to our everyday life. Furthermore and hopefully, it also refers to the multifaceted (and not

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\textsuperscript{4} Hereafter abbreviated to CSG.
rarely equivocal) dimension of inclusion of the other in a context of equal respect, or within the ideal “community of equals” that we think constitutes one of the characterizing nuances of the challenge of living together. We appreciate thus the relevance of a normative effort that originates from this concept.

The ascertaince of the Other includes the capability of sketching out, namely, or defining the Other. The second stage implies acceptance “of the otherness” in the Other. As can be easily understood, the distinction between the two levels can be realized only in an analytical manner, while in the realm of effective agency, the logical and epistemological levels will always be interrelated with the normative one.

The cognitive stage is concluded by the definition of the Other, while the normative one includes the emphasis of it without any references to the social environment and to the acceptance of it by the Other. It this sense, we can affirm that, while recognized, the Other not only “exists,” but also “resists” any attempt of assimilation resulting in a full redefinition of itself in terms completely internal to the language that is coming from an external perspective.

The field of recognition originates from the logical ability of identifying the Other, as well as it implies the normative issue of the Other’s acceptance. The normative instance is broadly interpreted and echoed, in order to contemplate a comprehensive reference to the public sphere that is not possible to develop here further [16]. This reference is related not only to the process of including or excluding the Other, but also to the recognition of the values that each single Other is embodying, by being aware of it or not.

In these terms, the third level of Recognition is formulated as the one that takes seriously into consideration the preliminary two levels, by increasing the normative expectations related to the entire process. We could call this level the approval of the Other. This stage opens the next degree of complexity. It infers a clear expectation of effective results of communication, at times unpredictable or revolting. Here we can observe as ascertaince is charged by acceptantive meaning.

The analysis of the acceptance stage encourages us to research first another phenomenological evident question: “whose volition is that to be accepted?” (“Who desires the acceptance”). Firstly, it presupposes the assertive (or cognitive) stage, that means that the Other should be accepted not only as a social member, but as individual capable of acting in a certain way. That is also important to underline, that members who are already included into the group do not perceive the group as a homogeneous union, the group is perceived as a monolithic being only in the case of interaction with another group or from the Other’s point of view.

Nonetheless, at least the second question should be taken into account, which is again “who is it?” Answering this question revisits the need of framing the contact with the Other accordingly with further modalities. The first of them is related to the approval of the Other, by acknowledging that “it should be recognized” in a certain way. It implies an attempt to answer two different but interrelated questions:

First, we need to recognize “something of” this subject. This includes features and cultural value specifications (attributes) and practices that are presumed to be legitimate and legitimized by being a member of a group. Second, we must recognize “something for” this subject, providing concrete meaning that this subject is an individual within this specific group, which is also the one to which we belong, too. Some of the “privileges,” namely, some predicates and individual attributes should be delegated and some of them
need to be approved. Moreover, these privileges should be formulated in a way that allows the Other to embrace a possible path of action that could be considered adequate by the other members of a group [17].

The next question that needs to be specified, or even the group of questions, concerns the problem of recognition for the Other who we have preliminary asserted and accepted. The point is that we need to estimate practices and public actions that should be done in order to approve the Other as member of our specific group. This refers to Kant's idea of *thun und lassen*, which inquires what acts or behaviour should the Other undertake and, at the same time, which of them should be avoided by them.

In the end, the Other should be able to set up their own identity narrative, that should be accomplished according to three rules: it should take into account the social context of the CSG; it should avoid the unlimited recognition of the Other's otherness; last but not least, it should be able to maintain a line of separation (or: the way for distinguishing) between the self and the group.

Thus, linearity is divided in two vectors; from *ascertaince* to *acceptance*, and from *acceptance* to *approval*. While the first one concerns the ethical sphere, first, the second finds out its more coherent development in the political and social one.

After having synthetically introduced these modalities, it might be important to explore their interconnectedness. Based on theoretical approaches of C. Geertz, the first modality can be emphasised by what we could call a categorical imperative for the globalized postmodernity: "We must learn to understand what we cannot embrace" [17]. Such a form of imperative should be taken into account in order to adopt the adequate pragmatic strategy to frame both vectors mentioned above.

If we move towards the second vector, it is easy to acknowledge that acceptance due to the Other is defined as measurement of our approval. This perspective exists within a unique perspective both in the field of acceptance of the Other and the approval of the Other by ourselves. These two cognitive actions are inseparable one from another.

What we could call the categorical imperative for the globalized postmodernity, in this case, can be interpreted as the warning of taking responsibility for the diversity of the Other. There is disappointment or, even, fear for the alternative to us which is pragmatically embodied in such a diversity. But the message that we might gain from Geertz's attempt, is the possibility of passing from a preliminary understanding of the Other as an “alternative to us,” to the normative understanding of the Other as an “alternative for us,” namely as an opportunity of understanding ourselves better and our capability of constructing our personal identity within a world inhabited by Others, by necessity more or less “close” to us, “tuned” with our own willingness to self-recognition that we embody first [17].

**Examples of theory applications and discussing points**

Should we consider how the outlined framework above could be applied to social reality at large, and is the reference to the Closed Social Groups (CSG) to be taken into

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5 For a more detailed articulation of this comprehensive framework see again [11], spec. Ch. 4.
6 The same Geertz underlines that “difference” does not imply the denial of “similarity.”
7 The term is based on the Robert Merton social theory and defined with several characteristics that are specific for the current theory of recognition. The present state of society and culture forces a person to be constantly involved in one or another group. Self-identification of the person arises from the comparison
consideration seriously? In fact, the reference to the CSG constitutes one of the best ways to illustrate the process of Recognition in the post-structural understanding of Otherness. The CSG have several features which allow us to compare social reality of Russian CSG to the theory of recognition, developed by our Italian colleague.

According to the anthropological research of Robin Dunbor, the maximum number of active connections in a group is 150 [18]. So, CSG usually do not have more members, and all of them permanently communicate in a closed social space. This allows the group to maintain direct contacts between all the members. Entering a CSG entails some complications, caused by its members. A CSG is concerned greatly about new members. On the one hand, if the CSG includes the member, who does not share the value system, it produces marginality in the group. On the other hand, the CSG usually poses itself as elitist among similar groups. Thus, the free expanse of the number of members results in a limitation of the symbolic price of a group on a social market [19].

Also, the CSG has a clear and stable structure, formal and informal leaders, so outsiders and novices are clearly identified. The activity of a CSG is ritualized, but the rituals are usually incorporated into the life of the group naturally, they are not perceived by the group's members. Specificity of language is also typical for CSG, both the rituals and the language determines the CSG values. Common public (“ethical”) values achieve their specific realization in each specific group (the so-called “emic” values).

Thus, the main characteristics of the CSG are: small size, consistency of structure, specific rituals and language, as well as a common manner of value specification. That means that the CSG have a dual social perception: they have a small community and the field of Others, who can or cannot enter the group.

The whole process of communication is impossible without implementation of the Recognition: without it the Other will not be assumed as an individual at all, but as an item of social surrounding, at best.

At first, the individual should be detached from the surroundings. The introduction of the individual to the CSG depends on the structure and specific characteristics of social organization in these groups. Moreover, there are different types of a “non-membered individual” in the social perception of CSG [19], meaning that individuals do not constitute a homogeneous social category for a CSG. During the cognitive stage of the recognition, the group members are trying to identify the Other as one of the type of non-members. Detachment of the Other from others begins.

In the case of a communal flat, a potential new member is introduced to the future flat-mates during an examination of the room by the owner of the flat or an agent. Flat-mates get to know the Other just at the moment they arrived at the flat, while the Other usually had already separated this flat out from others by relying on photos and pieces of written information about the roomers (at least their quantity, sex and pernicious habits). Normally, one of the flatmates explains to the Other some general living rules of the flat, such as rules of using the common space and sharing the collective expenses and the daily regime of the flatmates [20]. The Other also conveys general personal information. After this, the cognitive stage in the CSG is finished. In this example, this first stage of the recognition process is formed by the necessity of sojourning.

of themselves with members involved in one group or another. So CSG are a special form of a voluntary organization of people in the community.
The cognitive stage in office groups concludes after a successful interview. HR or the employer introduces a potential new colleague to the office and shows the new employee their workplace. It is important that the Office group, again, meets the Other for the first time, while the Other usually obtains information about the potential colleagues from the advertisement and the self-representation of the company on the Internet [21].

The nationalistic CSG is a slightly different case. Such groups are much more traditional and socially closed, as their value system is the only one thing that brings members into the CSG (office and flat members are forced into cohabitation). That is why the value system of nationalistic groups is focused on protecting them strongly from the intervention of the Other. Thus, in such groups, the Others are usually introduced by old members with previous approval of the group or the leader. In this case, both sides are equally prepared for their first contact. Thus, the cognitive stage begins prior to the actual meeting of the Other. CSG accepts the future intervention of the external part in advance.

The Others during the cognitive stage are specified as a separated individual, sometimes as a potential invader, which causes tension in communication between the Other and the group. It is results from the risk of including an “uninvolved” Other into the group. G. Zimmel describes the uninvolved Other in his Theory of Intersecting Social Circles as a specific kind of membership, that can imply a lot on a group and its social power. No group can be institutionalized if all of the members are not included in the group's activities. Such a group will not have an ability to obtain completeness of itself, because not all of the social roles are being realized [21]. That is why the leader of the CSG will usually hold a first-meeting with the Other: they are responsible for the welfare of the group, while the individual is searching for a reference group, which is based on agreement of values or the influence of the group. So the Other is constrained to find some basic information on the group, to make the first choice between another CSG.

As we previously mentioned, formal acceptance into the group does not mean individual participation in this group. Furthermore, recognition continues when the Other already shares a physical and social space with CSG. Thus, many CSG do not need only formal acceptance, but initiation as well. However, before the real acceptance of a new member, the moral stage takes place. On the moral stage of the recognition process, the Other is being accepted as an Other, their moral values are being looked into closely in order to define the level of conformity between him or her and the CSG. At the same time, the edification of ethical (the most general) values and codes to the Other occurs [21]. It is this stage when the group should understand definitely if the Other could be incorporated into the society.

The moral stage of the recognition process is a stage of revisions, tests, and endurance. This is the stage when a detached observer can explore the ethical system of a group’s values through the aspect of emical ones, as well as the purpose of the Other, and identify its values. Systems of ethical and emical values were explored by Itske Cramer: ethical values are the most general values (justice, pride, etc.), while emical values are specific for each group [21]. The ethical value for both organizations can be success, but for the first organization the emical value will be the number of arranged contracts, while for the second one that will be the number of employees subordinate to a person. In the office-CSG, the Other starts to assimilate at the same time they receive their first tasks. As time passes, tasks start to become more complicated. During the work, the group or the boss explains
the main principles and convey the ethical values. At the end of the moral stage, there is usually a test or a closing remark.

The Other, entering a new group, needs to become used to a whole new society. “…We shall notice, that living in the communal flat leads to specific character configuration… When into Communal flat arrives person, who never lived like this before, he or she has keen sense of disability to being alone, impossibility to escape from the flat mates… for member of communal flat permanent social involvement of the community is a neutral context” [20, p. 277]. After assimilation, the Other starts to incorporate into the group as an active unit: they need to clean the communal space and obtain his/her individual time to use it (it is common to have a timetable for using the bathroom, for example) [20].

Nationalist CSGs usually have their own codes, where their main ethical and ethical principles are manifested, so the moral stage is shortened to several meetings. Some organizations, such as, for example, Russian National Unity, have specific tasks for reaching each level of the hierarchy: from patrolling the streets, to management of the whole group meeting. After completion of the task, the head of the organization makes a decision on the acceptance of the Other into the group [22].

It is important for both constituents (the group and the Other) to discover a conjunction in the value systems. The group, on the moral level, after accepting the otherness of the potential member, is trying to clarify if they will fill the completeness of the group [23]. While the aim of the Other is to understand if this group is referential for them.

The Other on the moral stage is reflecting themselves as a stranger, assuming that they do not know any of the values of the company or simple rules of behaviour in the CSG. As a result, the members of the CSG need to share some information with the Other to build further communication. The moral stage also helps a person to adapt.

However, close living and sharing the same space (physical and social), again, does not imply inclusion into the group. Furthermore, sharing the space leads to a dissociation problem. After the moral stage there are several scenarios of relationships. The place of the Other in the social surrounding is designated at the end of moral stage.

Robert Merton indicated social positions of the Other, depending on the attitudes of the group and of the Other for joining the group. His organization is illustrated in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude of non-members to joining the group</th>
<th>Social position of the Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strive to join</td>
<td>Has a right to join</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>Candidates to become members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn't want to join</td>
<td>Has not rights to join</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Potential members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-detached individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>from social surrounding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-related to the group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antagonists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [19].

The stage of acceptance is the last stage of the recognition process, finalizing the whole previous communication of the group. The Other acquires their own social portrait after review of all evidence, useful and harmful, to the group. After that, the Other is allowed to join the group or placed in the external social surroundings.
Membership of people into the group is provided by the same values, as it reassures the old-members that the Other will not separate inside the group, making it incomplete [23]. This works in both ways. R. Merton noticed that some people who “aspire to membership in the group… have of course incorporated the first of these motivated attitudes toward the membership as constituting one mechanism making for positive orientation of non-members toward the norms of a group” [19, p. 344].

After placing the Other in some position within the social structure, attitudes between CSG and the Other become stable.

If the Other becomes a member of the group, the CSG is starting the “educational process”: explaining the particulars of the language and traditions. Usually, at the acceptance stage, different initiation ceremonies take place. In office companies it could be an officially organized corporative party, during which the elders are initiating new members into traditions of the company. Entering a flat is usually timed to coincide with one of the CSG common parties, when the new member is invited to the community festivity for the first time. The CSG of nationalists are the most traditional ones where the joining of a new member can be a fully ritualized ceremony with the singing of hymns and reciting of oaths to the community. The more closed the group is, the more sophisticated the initiation ceremony.

Non-related to the group, individuals (who are also members of the group) usually signal that the group has doubtful values and a life strategy in the moral context, either that it is socially weak or there is internal tension.

Another scenario is failure of the initiation process, due to results of the moral stage. The Other, in this case, does not share the traditions, specific language and other emic features. But, the Other still knows the value system of the group, as well as the group knows the Other’s value system. This allows the constituents to influence attitudes between them in the future.

For example, the office company can maintain an individual as an external person with a lower or even no wage, who aspired to be marginal. The antagonism is foremost seen in the co-living groups, when a person does not suit the community, but is still sharing the flat with others, causing different conflicts between the flatmates and possibly resulting in unhealthy behaviour, such as damaging personal and even communal property. The most unscathed way of ending the recognition process in the case of non-entrance of the Other is placing them as a non-detached one, which means that the individual returns back to society and the relationships are finished.

In the end of the recognition process, the Other accepts their new role in the society and assumes the suggested behavioural strategy, or the CSG and the Other create a new form of communication. Social codes reflect key values of the group and become emic values. At the same time, the emic values are honoured as traditions. It is important to elaborate the communicative strategy, as common living presupposes communicative sociability members of CSG to each other.

Results of the dialogue and perspectives of the theory

In this article we tried to further develop the reflections of contemporary Italian, Russian, and other scientists on the phenomena of recognition and re-actualization of “identity studies” in conjunction with historical processes, and attempted to present its
development and understanding, along with an analysis of the origins and current state of the problem, ways of philosophical comparison between various socio-demographic, national and socio-professional groups. The reviewed ideas propose various approaches to analysing recognition, such as ontological, sociological, and ethical.

According to the Russian tradition, we need to emphasize again that the term recognition was defined as perception of the Other in an individual way, nothing to do with the Other. The result of the recognition act is acceptance of the Other (their positive, and negative features, his lifestyle), which could happen even without any communication between subject and object. It was significantly restrained and focused only on an actor of the process (the person who recognises). In this case the important social factor of the term is ignored. The Other in this case is held as a passive object of the recognition process. The subject of recognition appears, in a Christian way, obliged to accept the Other. Russian tradition used to explain recognition as an empathic term, religious, and psychological.

On the contrary, the European tradition was focusing on the phenomenon that has to be recognised. Recognition, from the Aristotelian tradition was based on the action. The issue was to acknowledge features in the Other, which corresponds to what you already know, or to your identity. The European view was centred on this corresponding moment between two individuals. European recognition occurs from the recognizer to the Other, it is extroversive.

Nevertheless, as a result of our work, recognition is always a mutual complex process, and it originates from communication between two social actors. The important features of this process are twofold. On the one hand, we experience the intention of the Other to be recognised, on the other, the intention of the group to reproduce its completeness and internal understanding, following the rules of the recognition process. Recognition, in this case, is a long and complicated process of social communication, and it implies the actions of recogniser to acknowledge and accept the Other, as well as the activity of the Other, who is going to accept new concepts, their position as an Other and socialise in a new situation. We can discover it in contemporary everyday life, which is proved by examples taken from the CSG theory throughout the article. Thus, recognition is the process that is empathic and extroversive at the same time, the actor has to produce as inner (ascertance and acceptance) recognition, resulting in the external (approval).

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Взаимное признание: диалог между взглядами в Италии и России*,**

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Знание и понимание мозаичного, гипермодерного общества тесно связано с пониманием термина «признание». Сегодня данная тема незаслуженно потеряла популярность среди исследователей, несмотря на то что ранее занимала значительное место в русской философской традиции. Основные задачи статьи — основываясь на материале русской и европейской традиций уделить особое внимание новому итальянскому взгляду на проблему и представить актуальное понимание термина «признание».

Философский анализ, представленный в работе, обращается к теоретическим контекстам постструктурализма и соответствующим методикам, включая в себя компаративистский и междисциплинарный подходы. Методологический акцент делается на двух существенных аспектах признания: межличностном и групповом. Наш философский анализ признания стремится рассмотреть прежде всего проблемное поле инаковости. Представлены три модели инаковости, которые, в свою очередь, выдвинуты в соответствии с тремя различными моделями постановки вопроса о признании. Таким образом, процесс признания Другого рассматривается в соответствии с тремя стадиями одобрения: когнитивной, моральной и социальной. Когнитивное одобрение включает в себя идентификацию Другого как противоположного группе, а также каждому отдельному человеку. Нравственная стадия предполагает конкретизацию социальных условий и принятие Другого в целом, с элементами уважения и признания. На стадии социального одобрения индивид признается в социальном контексте группы (закрытой социальной группы) как признаваемый или отвергаемый. Конкретизация процесса признания ведет к уменьшению числа конфликтов, прояснению границ и принятию инаковости как неотъемлемой части индивидуальности. Изложенное здесь развитие теории признания является новым для российского научного контекста и важным для развития русско-итальянского философского диалога. Кроме того, представлена попытка сравнения общего (классического и постклассического) понимания инаковости на основе актуальных итальянских теоретических разработок. Теория иллюстрируется анализом функционирования закрытых социальных групп, представленных как серия кейсов, что также должно способствовать развитию исследовательского интереса к изучению теорий социальной реальности как в российском, так и в итальянском научном сообществах.

**Ключевые слова:** признание, принятие, Другой, идентичность, закрытые социальные группы.

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