THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE IN M. HEIDEGGER’S FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY

Abstract

Th e outcomes of the analysis of M. Heidegger’s concept of existence are presented in this article. It is shown that Heidegger regards this concept as a special mode of being, and this mode belongs only to human Dasein. Th erefore, one ought to distinguish existence from other modes of being, including the presence as a mode of being of nature. Th e article argues that Heidegger`s approach towards existence presupposes that he can hardly be treated as a representative of existentialism. On the one hand, the adherents of this philosophical trend understand the existence as presence, but not as a special mode of being diff erent from the presence; although they maintain the priority of existence in regard to the essence in case of human beings. On the other hand, the description of existence is the end in itself for existentialists, but the analytics of existentiality is the way to develop the doctrine of the sense of being as such, according to Heidegger.

Keywords:

existence, Dasein, fundamental ontology, existential analytic of Dasein, ecstasis, temporality, M. Heidegger, existentialism