Truth. Absolute or Relative?

Authors

  • Илькка Нийнилуото University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland;
  • Артем Александрович Савченко Балтийский Федеральный университет им. И. Кан- та;
  • Елена Николаевна Лисанюк St. Petersburg State University, 7–9, Universitetskaya nab., St. Petersburg, 199034, Russian Federation

Abstract

In the paper, I consider a fundamental philosophical question about truth, whether the notion of truth is absolute or relative. In the philosophy of science and logic many supporters of the both views can be found. Th e Polish logical school is normally said to hold the absolute view. However, 124 Tarski’s semantical conception of truth which introduces a model-theoretical defi nition of it in this way turns towards a relativisation of truth. In this vein, the ideas of K. Twardowski, J. Wolenski and some other scholars belonging to the school are discussed. H. Cappelen and J. Hawthorne in their fair contextualist criticism of the new school of relativists seem to share that Tarski’s defi nition of truth agrees well enough with the objectivity of truth, as they argue against the possible worlds semantics that truth is a monadic property of propositions. In my view, various sorts of alethic relativists are mistaken, when they claim that truths are relative to persons, communities, cultures, beliefs, paradigms, or perspectives. Furthermore, what Tarski called the “the classical Aristotelian conception of truth” is a relational notion, but its relational character is compatible with the objectivity of truth. Indeed, in my view, Tarski’s model-theoretical concept of truth amended with the notion of truthlikeness provides an adequate basis for a fallibilist critical scientifi c realism which expresses conceptual pluralism advocated here: the world can be described in alternative linguistic frameworks, and all of these frameworks may have interesting objective truths for us to off er.

Keywords:

absolute truth, relativism, fallibilism, truthlikeness, scientific realism, objective truth, Tarski’s definition of truth

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References

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Published

2018-12-11

How to Cite

Нийнилуото, И., Савченко, А. А., & Лисанюк, Е. Н. (2018). Truth. Absolute or Relative?. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies, 29(4), 16–27. Retrieved from https://philosophyjournal.spbu.ru/article/view/3243

Issue

Vol. 29 No. 4 (2013): Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Series 17. PHILOSOPHY. CONFLICT STUDIES. CULTURE STUDIES. RELIGIOUS STUDIES.

Section

Philosophy

License

Articles of "Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.