Rаtionality, conceptual imagination and myth

Authors

  • Maja E. Soboleva Alpen-Adria University of Klagenfurt, 65–67, Universitätsstraße, Klagenfurt-am-Wörthersee, 9020, Austria

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2021.309

Abstract

The article addresses the problem of how myth relates to rationality. In the classical formulation, this question appears in the following manner: are mythos and logos opposites? It can be stated that myth has become one of the key themes of philosophy in the 20th century. It has been studied in ethnography and anthropology, cultural studies, art theory, political science and even in the theory of knowledge. Myth is understood not only as a special artistic form, but also a special form of intuition, form of thinking, and form of life. Despite the sometimes cardinal difference in approaches to the analysis of myth, one common feature in its understanding can be identified. Mythical thinking is considered either as irrational or as protorational. For example, in Cassirer and Blumenberg, myth appears as an affective rationality, in Vico and Schelling — as a poetic rationality. The reason for this can be seen in the fact that myth is considered as a product of imagination. The latter is indisputable, but does this mean that myth and rationality are incompatible? In order to answer this question, the concept of imagination should be analyzed. Drawing on the theories of Hume, Aristotle, and Kant, the author contends that there is a special type of imagination referred to as “conceptual”, which is a human capacity of spontaneous production of concepts. The conceptual imagination seems to be a distinctive feature of human rationality. However, if this is so, then rationality is a condition of myth and not its counterpart. Myth and discursive thinking thus turn out to be merely different forms of realization of our human rationality, of which discursive imagination is the common basis.

Keywords:

myth, conceptual imagination, imagination, rationality, Aristotle, Hume, Kant

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References


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Published

2021-10-22

How to Cite

Soboleva, M. E. . (2021). Rаtionality, conceptual imagination and myth. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies, 37(3), 479–492. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2021.309