The positive philosophy by William Whewell: Between inductivism and apriorism

Authors

  • Илья Теодорович Касавин Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, 12/1, Goncharnaya str., Moscow, 109420, Russian Federation
  • Александр Леонидович Никифоров Lobachevsky State University, 23-1, pr. Gagarina, Nizhnij Novgorod, 603950, Russian Federation

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2018.404

Abstract

One can notice a certain deficiency of conceptual resources in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. The popularity of post-positivist philosophy is dropping; and the postmodern studies have difficulty adapting to the analysis of scientific knowledge. In this regard, an amplified interest in the forgotten figures of the 19 century arises. Among them, the personality of William Whewell attracts special attention – the Cambridge philosopher, scholar, scientist, theologian, priest, polymath, a major reformer of university education, and father-figure of the British philosophy of science. In the article, the authors define his place in the 19th century philosophy as well as in the context of current discussions. Historical reconstruction of his concept of method of scientific cognition shows that it is hardly reducible to ideas by D. Hume or I. Kant and simultaneously possesses the essentially original features in comparison with the known concepts of his time by O. Comte and J.S. Mill. A comparison of Whewell’s philosophy of science with the hypothetical-deductive method described by neopositivists or with Karl Popper’s falsificationism though grasps some similarities, still risks unwarranted modernization. His original method of synthesis of empiricism and rationalism in the understanding of scientific knowledge in fact lays the groundwork for a historically oriented philosophy of science long before the historical epistemology of the French school. Accessing the analysis of ideas of William Whewell and introducing them in philosophical turnover resurrects a unique cultural and intellectual context of formation of professional science in the Victorian era, contributes to the restoration of historical justice, leads to the revision of a number of historical and philosophical imprints, in particular, in assessing the positivism and analytic philosophy, and also provides up-to-date discussions in philosophy of science by the new empirical staff.

Keywords:

William Whewell, the Victorian philosophy of science, apriori, empiricism, induction, rationalism, ideas, history of science

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References

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Published

2019-01-14

How to Cite

Касавин, И. Т., & Никифоров, А. Л. (2019). The positive philosophy by William Whewell: Between inductivism and apriorism. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies, 34(4), 501–514. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2018.404