“I” and collective responsibility

Authors

  • Elena V. Bakeeva Ural Federal University
  • Ekaterina V. Biricheva Institute for Philosophy and Law, Ural Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2021.104

Abstract

The article discusses the link of collective moral responsibility with “I” as an act of the realization of subjectness. The authors provide and verify the thesis about the primacy of “I” to any forms and cases of collective responsibility. The notion of “I” is reexamined taking into account the critique of the subject undertaken in the so-called “post-metaphysical” (J.Habermas) philosophy. The key point of this critique is the rejection of the understanding of “I” and of the subject as unchanging metaphysical entities. In this situation, it is of paramount importance to distinguish the dynamic core of “I”, which is free from any metaphysical connotation. In addressing this issue, the authors build on the concept of “I” as a responsible act (deed) as presented in works of Mikhail Bakhtin. According to this concept, “I” does not precede the act but is born in the actual responsible act in the face of an Other. This action turns out to be devoid of content here and is interpreted as an act of accepting responsibility in the face of the Absolute instance. Such an interpretation of “I” makes it possible to retain the possibility of a responsible act within the growing anonymity of a contemporary social being and to substantiate manifestations of collective responsibility in collective actions. The final part of the article lists the basic features that characterize the link of “I” as an act and collective responsibility. Of these features, the main one is associated with the impossibility of “external” vesting of responsibility to anyone due to his/her belonging to a certain community. Collective responsibility may be recognized only in the “inner” dimension of a personal act. Hence follows a fundamental asymmetry that characterizes the phenomenon of responsibility in general and collective responsibility in particular.

Keywords:

“I”, collective responsibility, act, deed, Immanuel Kant, Mikhail Bakhtin

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References

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Published

2021-03-31

How to Cite

Bakeeva, E. V., & Biricheva, E. V. (2021). “I” and collective responsibility. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies, 37(1), 41–52. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2021.104

Issue

Vol. 37 No. 1 (2021): Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies

Section

Philosophy

License

Articles of "Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.